Abstract. Multicast content delivery can be expected to become a major source of revenue with the increase of private broadband fixed and mobile communications. Several multicast applications require the receivers to securely send some real-time information back to the source, which leads to a many-to-one communication scenario. Using unicast connections to send this reverse traffic results in a data implosion which may swamp the source with incoming communication. In order to avoid this problem, a method for aggregating the information as it is being sent back to the source is presented in this paper. Confidentiality and authentication are guaranteed at the symbol level for this reverse realtime traffic.
simultaneous users sending data to the source can potentially overwhelm the latter, a situation usually known as implosion problem [Quin01] . In addition to requiring solutions to implosion, some many-to-one applications require secure and real-time transmission.
Contribution and Plan of This Paper
We propose in this paper a scalable and secure protocol for reverse many-to-one communication in a multicast tree. Our proposal is based on super-increasing sequences and probabilistic additive public-key privacy homomorphisms. Since our scheme is designed for real-time reverse traffic, it is assumed that information cannot be buffered but should be sent symbol by symbol as these are generated by the user. Therefore, security is provided at the symbol level and consists of communications secrecy and user authentication.
Section 2 gives some background on super-increasing sequences and probabilistic additive public-key privacy homomorphisms. Section 3 describes the mechanism we propose for many-to-one communication. Section 4 deals with the security of the proposed scheme. A performance analysis is reported in Section 5. Section 6 contains some conclusions and suggestions for future work.
Background Concepts
The basic tools used in our proposal are described next.
Super-Increasing Sequences and the K napsack Problem
Given a sequence of positive integers S = { S 1 ,S 2 , . . . , S m − 1 ,S m } and a value T which is the sum of some elements of S , the knapsack problem [Merk78] consists of finding a subset S = { S a ,S b ,...,S j } , of S whose sum equals T .
The general knapsack problem is known to be an NP-complete problem, but there are some cases in which the problem can be solved polynomially. This is the case when the sequence S is super-increasing.
A sequence of positive integers S = { S 1 ,S 2 , . . . , S m − 1 ,S m } is super-increasing if every term is greater than the sum of all previous terms, i.e.
Given asuper-increasing sequence, the knapsackproblem can easily be solved using the following recursivep rocedure:
1. Initially,a ll values S i greater than T are marked as not being part of the solution. 2. Take the largest unmarked element S j ∈Sand checkwhether S j ≤ T .Ifthe checki spositive, mark S j as being part of the solution and let T := T − S j . Otherwise mark S j as not being part of the solution and leave T unaltered.
3. Solve the problem for the remaining unmarked elements in S . 4. The problem is correctly solved if and only if T equals 0 when all elements in S have been marked.
The scheme in this paper uses super-increasing sequences to aggregate integer values in a reversible way.
Additive Privacy H omomorphisms
Privacy homomorphisms (PHs) are encryption transformations mapping a set of operations on cleartext to another set of operations on ciphertext. Basically, PHs are encryption functions E : CT → CT allowing a set F of operations on a ciphertext domain CT to be carried out without knowledge of the decryption function D . Knowledge of D allows the result of the corresponding set F of operations on a cleartext domain CT to be retrieved. A PH is called additive when its set F of cleartext operations contains addition. A PH is called probabilistic if the encryption algorithm E involves some random mechanism that chooses the ciphertext corresponding to a given cleartext from a set of possible ciphertexts.
Privacy homomorphisms that will be used in our proposal below must be additive, probabilistic and public-key. In [John02] , it is shown that additive PHs are insecure in front of known-cleartext attacks if used for signing. Thus, in our scheme the public-key additive PH is only used for encryption. We next give an example of a probabilistic additive public-key PH.
Example 1. The Okamoto-Uchiyama [Okam98] probabilistic public-key cryptosystem (OUPH) has an additive homomorphic property. This probabilistic public-key cryptosystem is proven to be as secure as the intractability of factoring n = p 2 p against passive adversaries, where p and p are two large primes.
Secure Many-to-O ne Bit Transmission
This section describes our proposal for secure reverse many-to-one communication in a multicast context. A basic construction is first described which allows transmission of one binary or ternary symbol. A generalization is then presented for transmission of a q -ary symbol or a block of bits.
The B asic Construction
The construction consists of a set-up protocol to be run before any transmissions are started, and a transmission protocol to be run for each symbol transmission.
Protocol 1 (Set-up).
The source chooses parameters l , u , where l will be used below and u is the number of users.
8 After set-up, the normal operation of the scheme consists of many-to-one transmissions of binary or ternary symbols. In order to collect abinary or ternary symbolf rom eachu ser, the following four-step protocol is used:
The source generates 2 u intervals as follows:
Protocol 2( Many-to-one binary or ternary transmission).
Transmission request.Achallenge message is multicast by the source to all users. This challenge contains ar andom value v . 2. Message generation.
(a) When au ser U i receives the challenge message, she computes 
A G eneralization for q -ary or B lock Transmission
The basic construction given above can be generalized as follows to accomodate transmission of q -ary symbols or blocks of bits:
1. During Protocol 1 generate and publish tu intervals I j rather than 2 u intervals. Condition (1) must be modified by replacing 2u with tu.
During Protocol 2:
(a) Each user U i takes t consecutive intervals I ti− t +1 , ···, I ti and generates t terms the super-increasing sequence as:
t − 1 different values by sending the encrypted sum of a subset chosen among the 2 t − 1 non-empty subsets of { S ti− t +1 , ···,S ti } Note that the encrypted sum of the empty subset ( i.e. E PK (0)) cannot be used to encode a value in a secure transmission because anyone can send it (no authentication) or guess it (no confidentiality). Thus, U i can either transmit a q -ary symbol or a block of t − 1 bits (the first option is clearly less wasteful).
(c) Message aggregation in the generalization stays the same as in Protocol 2. (d) Symbolextraction by the source in the generalization must use the same mapping between subsets and q -ary symbolv alues used by users during message generation. This mapping assumed to be public.
4S ecurity
We next state the securityp roperties of our scheme, whicha re proveni nt he Appendix. 
Property1( Confidentiality). If asecureprobabilistic additive public-key PH is usedi nw hich therei san egligible probability of obtaining the same ciphertext as ar esult of two independent encryptions of the same cleartext, then an intruder cannot determine the symbol transmittedb yau ser in Protocol2 .

Property2( Authentication
5P erformance
Before presenting the performance comparison below, some preliminary remarks are required:
-The performance criterion considered is the bandwidth required by the reverse traffic. -In order to benchmark the performance of our system, we will consider an alternativesystem based on unicast transmissions from eachuser to the source. Likei no ur system, the unicast transmissions in the benchmark system will be symbol-wise. We assume that the communication is real-time, so that symbols are transmitted as they are generated, rather than being buffered and transmitted in batches. -We will require that eachs ymbolt ransmission in the alternativeu nicast system has the same securityp roperties as transmissions in our system. -Forthe sakeofconcreteness, we will use OUPH as aprivacy homomorphism in this section.
AB enc hma rk U nicast S ystem
In order to avoid the need of public-key encryption for a user to send a confidential and authenticated symbol, we must assume that each user U i shares with the source a key k i corresponding to a block cipher (e.g. AES). The message M containing the symbol b will thus look like
where E k i ( · ) stands for the encryption function of the block cipher, ts is a timestamp, ck is a checksum and U i is the identity of user U i . Integrity is ensured by ck and ts (the time-stamp prevents replacing future transmissions with past transmissions).
Comparison
When u users simultaneously send their encrypted symbols with the benchmark unicast system, u ( B + log 2 u ) bits are received by the source, assuming that the B is the block bitlength of the block cipher and log 2 u is the bitlength of the user identifier U i . We assume also that the bitlength of b ||ts||ck is less than or equal to B . For a block cipher such as AES, at least one has B = 128, so the previous assumption is reasonable. When u users send their encrypted bits/symbols with our system, all symbol transmissions are eventually aggregated into a single message
whichi st he only one reaching the source. M can be at most n ,s oi ts length is log 2 n .E quivalently,t he bitlength of M is
where we have used that, in OUPH, n = p 2 p with | p | = | p | .N ow,a lready for am oderate number u of users, p can be chosen close to its lowerb ound (1) while remaining large enough for factoring of n = p 2 p to be hard, as required by OUPH. Therefore, if we use the generalized bound (1) with tu instead of 2 u , we have
It can be seen that expression (3) is dominated by 3 tu as the number of users grows. Therefore, if the number u of users is moderate to large and if the symbol bitlength is t<( B +log 2 u ) / 3, the bandwidth 3 tu required by our scheme is less than the bandwidth u ( B +log 2 u )r equired by the benchmark unicast system. Since typical block sizes are as large as B =6 4 , 128, 192 or 256, the previous assumption on the symbolb itlength is reasonable.
Besides, our proposal only requires one reverse incoming connection to the source, whereas the unicast alternative requires u reverse connections to the source, which calls for allocation of additional overhead bandwidth not included in the above comparison.
Note 2. The primary aim of our proposal is reverse bandwidth reduction. It must be noticed that this is achieved without increasing the computational burden at the source. Symbol extraction during Protocol 2 requires the source to build tu terms of a super-increasing sequence and to solve a super-increasing knapsack problem. The computational cost of doing this is similar to the cost of the u block decryptions required by the unicast benchmark.
Conclusions and E xample Applications
The thrust behind the design of the scheme in this paper was the need to securely send real-time reverse information in multicast scenarios, that is, information whose symbols should not be buffered but be sent as they are generated. This requirement not being exclusive of multicast, our scheme can be applied whenever a large number of users or devices must communicate in real-time with a single node and there is a risk that the incoming bandwidth available at the receiving node may be a bottleneck. Example applications include:
-Secure multicast. The scheme presented can be used for users to securely send keepalive messages to the source, who can keep track of who is logged on. A step further is to use the scheme for real-time pay-per-view multicast: the users send payment information back to the source, and stop receiving multicast contents if they stop sending payment. -Secure collection of control information. A control center securely collects periodical status information from a large number of sensors or other devices. This is similar to sending reverse traffic in a multicast scenario.
The proposed scheme uses super-increasing sequences and probabilistic additive public-key homomorphic encryption to aggregate traffic. It guarantees confidentiality and authentication of the transmitted q -ary symbols. Thanks to aggregation, the source only needs to establish one incoming connection. In the special case where the Okamoto-Uchiyama PH is used, the required incoming bandwidth at the source for u users approximates 3 tu bits when each user securely transmits one q -ary symbol at a time, with q = 2 t − 1. This is not so far from the u log 2 q ≈ tu bits required for insecure transmission of u q -ary symbols. Achieving the same security properties using unicast transmissions would typically need Bu bits split in u user-source connections, where B is the block size of a block cipher.
